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PREPLEA DISCOVERY: GUILTY PLEAS AND THE
LIKELIHOOD OF CONVICTION AT TRIAL
The majority of convictions for federal and state crimes result
from guilty pleas. Few jurisdictions have plea rates lower than sixty
percent and some have rates estimated as high as ninety-five percent.'
Such figures reflect a pervasive plea bargaining process in which pros-
ecutorial concessions and judicial sentencing practices encourage pleas
of guilty2
The constitutional requirement of a "knowing and voluntary"
waiver of the right to a trial protects a defendant against coercion by
the prosecutor or judge 3 and against guilty pleas entered in ignorance
1See A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 28-29 (1967); D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION:
THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 8 (1966); PRESIDENT'S
CoMm'N ON LAW ENFORCEMFENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SocETry 134 (1967); Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Com-
promises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964).
2 See D. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 66; Note, supra note 1, at 865-66; notes 11-12
infra & accompanying text. Courts have generally accepted plea bargaining. See,
e.g., Brown v. Beto, 377 F.2d 950, 956 (5th Cir. 1967); People ex rel. Valle v.
Bannan, 364 Mich. 471, 475-76, 110 N.W.2d 673, 675-76 (1961); Note, Official
Inducements to Plead Guilty: Suggested Morals for the Market Place, 32 U. CHI. L.
Rrv. 167, 174-78 (1964).
In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), the Supreme Court upheld a
guilty plea made to secure a more lenient sentence. The defendant plead guilty after
his indictment under a statute which provided that the death penalty could be im-
posed only by a jury. In assessing the voluntariness of his plea, the Court noted that
the defendant might never plead guilty absent the possibility or certainty that
the plea will result in a lesser penalty than the sentence that could be imposed
after a trial and a verdict of guilty. We decline to hold, however, that a
guilty plea is compelled and invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever
motivated by the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a
lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of possibilities extending from
acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty authorized by law for the crime
charged.
Id. at 751.
3 The prosecutor is permitted to bargain quite freely as long as he does not bypass
defense counsel. See, e.g., Martin v. United States, 256 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1958)
(guilty plea voluntary where prosecutor agreed to drop capital charge in return);
Barber v. Gladden, 220 F. Supp. 308 (D. Ore. 1963), aff'd, 327 F.2d 101 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 971 (1964) (guilty plea may be voluntary though prosecutor
threatens to invoke habitual criminal statute at trial) ; Anderson v. North Carolina,
221 F. Supp. 930, 934-35 (W.D.N.C. 1963) (constitutionally guaranteed right to
counsel extends to plea bargaining stage).
The judge, however, is generally prohibited from participating in the plea bar-
gaining process. See, e.g., Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1957)
(guilty plea involuntary when judge said that if defendants were found guilty at
trial he "would feel that they should have the maximum sentence provided by law") ;
United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
("A guilty plea predicated upon a judge's promise of a definite sentence by its very
nature does not qualify as a free and voluntary act."). But see Brown v. Peyton,
39 U.S.L.W. 2386 (4th Cir., Dec. 29, 1970) (guilty plea voluntary where trial judge
told defense counsel that defendant would receive only a life sentence if he plead
guilty); United States ex rel. McGrath v. LaVallee, 348 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1965)
(judge's opinion that a defendant's chances of acquittal were slim and that a long
sentence would be imposed at trial did not invalidate a guilty plea when no promises
were made). The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a case involving
judicial participation in the plea bargaining process. Green v. Kentucky, 39 U.S.L.W.
3297 (U.S., Jan. 11, 1971).
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of the offenses charged and the potential penalties.4  A defendant is
thus guaranteed an opportunity to balance the possible consequences
of a trial against the certain consequences of a guilty plea. But to
make a fully informed decision to plead guilty or stand trial, he must
also be able to assess knowledgeably the likelihood of conviction at
trial.5
Both federal and state courts permit defendants preparing for trial
to discover certain evidence in the possession of the prosecutor.' This
Comment contends that defendants should be afforded similar oppor-
tunities for discovery prior to entry of a plea: 7 a defendant can assess
the likelihood of conviction at trial only if he first secures and evaluates
relevant evidence held by the prosecutor. The Comment will discuss
the rationale for preplea discovery and propose specific changes in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
4 See, e.g., Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941); DeLeon v. United
States, 355 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1966); Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667 (9th
Cir. 1963).
5 The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of assessing the likelihood
of conviction:
[T]he decision to plead guilty before the evidence is in frequently involves
the making of difficult judgments. All the pertinent facts normally cannot
be known unless witnesses are examined and cross-examined in court. Even
then the truth will often be in dispute. In the face of unavoidable uncer-
tainty, the defendant and his counsel must make their best judgment as to
the weight of the State's case. Counsel must predict how the facts, as he
understands them, would be viewed by a Court.
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769 (1970) (emphasis added). This Comment,
however, contends that the uncertainty is not entirely "unavoidable" but can be
substantially reduced through discovery prior to pleading.
6 See FED. R. CRnm. P. 16. See also id. 7(f), 15, 17. About a third of the states
accept the view that trial courts lack power to allow discovery in the absence of
legislation. Most others permit discovery at the discretion of the trial judge. See
Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19 HAsTNGs L.J. 865, 867-68 (1968).
Many commentators have argued for broader discovery. See, e.g., Brennan,
The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth, 1963 WAsH. U.L.Q.
279; Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964 Duam L.J.
477; Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REv. 293
(1960) ; Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1172-99 (1960) ; Louisell, Criminal Discovery:
Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 56 (1961) ; Louisell, The Theory of
Criminal Discovery and the Practice of Criminal Law, 14 VAND. L. REv. 921 (1961);
Margolin, Toward Effective Criminal Discovery in California-A Practitioner's View,
56 CALIF. L. REv. 1040 (1968) ; Moore, supra; Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in
Criminal Discovery in England, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228 (1964).
" No jurisdiction currently appears to authorize defense discovery prior to
entry of a plea, either as a statutory right or as a matter of judicial discretion. Cf.
sources cited note 6 supra. Rule 16(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
authorizes pretrial discovery "only within 10 days after arraignment or at such
reasonable later time as the court may permit." FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(f). The
defendant must enter his plea at the arraignment, id. 10. While rule 16(f) sets no
initial time prior to which discovery may not be had, the words "only within 10 days
after arraignment!' at least suggest that prearraignment discovery was not contem-
plated and the words "only within" are susceptible of a construction limiting disclosure
to the period after arraignment.
Rule 16 further limits discovery of some kinds of evidence to cases where there
has been a showing of "materiality to the preparation of [defendant's] defense and
that the request is reasonable." Id. 16(b); see, e.g., United States v. Hrubik, 280
F. Supp. 481 (D.C. Alas. 1968); United States v. Crisona, 271 F. Supp. 150 (S.D.
N.Y. 1967).
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I. A RATIONALE FOR PREPLEA DISCOVERY
The legitimacy of the state's power to punish an individual for
alleged criminal conduct rests on probabilities rather than certainties.
As Professor Bator has observed:
The task of assuring [the] legality [of an incarceration]
is to define and create a set of arrangements and procedures
which provide a reasoned and acceptable probability that
justice will be done, that the facts found will be "true" and
the law applied "correct." 8
Developed to realize this goal, the trial process seeks to maximize
the probability that guilty individuals are adjudged "guilty" and
innocent individuals "not guilty." Although scarcity of resources
precludes a trial in every case, elementary fairness suggests that any
alternative procedure for determining guilt should yield results con-
sistent with the probable outcome at trial: a defendant should not be
induced to plead guilty if conviction at trial is unlikely. In Brady v.
United States,9 the Supreme Court implicitly accepted this proposition
when it observed that through conviction by guilty plea "scarce judicial
and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there
is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is a
substantial doubt that the state can sustain its burden of proof." 1o
The plea bargaining process, however, may encourage a defendant
to plead guilty without regard to whether he could be convicted at
trial. Prosecutors offer to recommend a light sentence or to reduce
charges or counts in exchange for a guilty plea," and judges commonly
impose lighter sentences on defendants pleading guilty than on those
convicted at trial.' The defendant must in turn determine whether to
plead guilty and receive a certain, reduced penalty or face the uncer-
tainties of a trial and the risk of a severe sentence.
The parties assess the uncertainties of trial and bargain with each
other from unequal positions. During the period immediately following
arrest, the prosecutor can secure the police investigation report which
summarizes the observations of witnesses, describes the physical evi-
dence, and contains the results of scientific and medical tests. He may
8 Bator, Fiality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
76 HA{v. L. REv. 441, 448 (1963).
9397 U.S. 742 (1970).
lo Id. at 752.
"1 See generally D. NEwMAx, supra note 1, at 78-90. For a description of the
plea bargaining process in Philadelphia and New York, see White, A Proposal for
Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1971).
12 Chalker, Judicial Myopia, Differential Sentencing and the Guilty Plea-A Con-
stitutional Examination, 6 Am. CinI. L.Q. 187, 188 (1968) ; Comment, The Influence
of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 YAi. L.J. 204,
206-09 (1956). Differential sentencing based solely upon the defendantes choice to
exercise his right to trial has been argued to be an unconstitutional denial of equal
protection. Chalker, supra at 197.
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also be able to obtain information from the defendant himself, despite
judicially imposed restrictions on interrogation. 3 Finally, he can
question witnesses before the grand jury in the absence of defendant
or his counsel.' 4
In contrast, because he usually lacks resources for conducting an
independent investigation, defense counsel's primary source of informa-
tion is the defendant. Even if an independent investigation can be
made, the prosecutor may possess medical or scientific reports which
cannot be duplicated or statements of unavailable witnesses. Although
defense counsel may request from the prosecutor the names of wit-
nesses, the police investigation report, or similar evidence, satisfaction
of his request depends upon his working relationship with the pros-
ecutor and upon the number of prosecutors involved in the case. If the
prosecutor and the defense counsel are unfriendly or if a different
prosecutor controls each phase of the prosecution, information may be
impossible to obtain.'" Or the prosecutor may permit examination of
its files or the police investigation report when its case is strong, but
deny it in a close case.
Nor do more formal discovery procedures assist the defendant in
assessing the prosecutor's case.' Although the preliminary hearing
affords the defendant access to some adverse evidence, the prosecutor
need disclose only enough evidence to establish probable cause or a
prima facie case of guilt," and may withhold other evidence for use at
trial. 8 Even this limited discovery can be nullified if the prosecutor
13 A detailed study of the effect of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) on
police interrogations in New Haven, Connecticut concluded that the required warnings
did not significantly reduce the number of statements or confessions given by defend-
ants in custody. Note, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76
YALE L.J. 1519 (1967).
14 Margolin, supra note 6, at 1041; Traynor, supra note 6, at 231.
'5 Margolin, supra note 6, at 1047.
16 One defense counsel has been quoted as stating:
When we demand to see the police reports and copies of any confessions, we
are told that perhaps an appellate court will let us see them. When we file
a formal motion to produce, the prosecutor responds that he does not have
what we're asking for. What he means is that he turned the evidence over
to the arresting officer as soon as he received our motion. When we then
file a strong motion to divulge or quash, we can't get a proper hearing.
The judge treats the motion lightly and remarks that we can take the matter
up again at trial. The result is that we are always negotiating in the dark.
The atmosphere is one of chance-taking, and the tendency is always to plead
people who are effectively unconvictable.
Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 50, 66
(1968).
17 Goldstein, supra note 6, at 1183; Comment, The Preliminary Examination in
the Federal System: A Proposal for a Rule Change, 116 U. P .& L. REv. 1416, 1418
(1968).
'3 See Goldstein, .supra note 6, at 1183; cf. Comment, Preliminary Hearings in
Pennsylvania: A Closer Look, 30 U. Pirr. L. REv. 481, 488-90 (1969). In England,
the preliminary hearing is an effective discovery device for the defendant because the
prosecutor is required to present all the evidence he intends to use at trial and because
any evidence discovered after the hearing must be disclosed to the defendant if it is to
be used at trial. P. DEVLiN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUnTON IN ENGLAND 112 (1958).
Yet the defendant still cannot discover evidence inadmissible at trial, there may be
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can secure continuances until the grand jury returns an indictment. 9
Thus plea bargaining is nonadversary. Whether a guilty plea
reflects the likelihood of conviction at trial depends largely upon the
prosecutor's good faith and accuracy in evaluating the evidence. In
view of his inability to assess the strength of the case against him, a
defendant-regardless of his actual guilt or innocence or whether he
could be convicted at trial-might readily decide to accept a certain,
reduced penalty rather than risk the uncertainties of a trial and a
possible heavy sentence. Plea bargaining conducted after a defendant
has been afforded the opportunity to discover evidence held by the
prosecutor would equalize the parties' respective bargaining positions
and minimize the risk that a defendant would plead guilty because he
was erroneously convinced that the prosecution had a strong case
against him.
Preplea discovery might also help to maximize the efficient utiliza-
tion of judicial and prosecutorial resources. Because a prosecutor may
wish to improve his trial conviction record,2" he may allow strong as
well as weak cases to go to trial. Preplea discovery would deter this
practice by encouraging defendants unlikely to prevail at trial to plead
guilty, thereby conserving scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources
for trying cases in which the defendant's guilt is uncertain.
Despite its potential benefits, preplea discovery is likely to provoke
much criticism. First, critics may contend that it will be difficult and
costly to administer. But much of the material requested will be
documents, such as confessions, statements of witnesses, ballistics re-
ports, and evidentiary analyses, which the prosecutor can easily show
or give to defense counsel. Even if a document contains both dis-
coverable and nondiscoverable information, requiring the prosecutor to
separate the two is not an unwarranted burden. In addition, although
receiving and deciding preplea discovery requests obviously increases
the judicial workload, the number of collateral attacks on guilty pleas
might simultaneously be reduced. Because courts might readily con-
sider a defendant's opportunity to evaluate the case against him prior
to entering a plea as evidence of the plea's voluntariness, they would
tend to find such pleas to be uncoerced, thus deterring collateral attacks
upon their validity. Further, a defendant pleading guilty after exam-
ining all the evidence might be less disposed to contest his plea than a
defendant denied access to such information. Finally, should a de-
admissible evidence favorable to the defendant which the prosecutor does not intend
to use at trial, and the prosecution can introduce previously undisclosed evidence at
the trial to impeach defense witnesses. Traynor, supra note 6, at 755-58.
19 Comment, supra note 17, at 1420-26. See also Weinberg & Weinberg, The
Congressional Invitation to Avoid the Preliminary Hearing: An Analysis of Section
303 of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, 67 MicH. L. REv. 1361 (1969). In
United States v Amabile, 395 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968), the court specifically stated
that neither the language of rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure nor
its history indicated that the preliminary hearing was intended to provide defendants
with pretrial discovery. Id. at 54.
20 White, supra note 11, at 445-46.
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fendant decide to stand trial, preplea discovery will only be an earlier
expenditure of judicial and prosecutorial resources which would have
been expended later under the present pretrial discovery procedures.
Second, critics may assert that broad preplea discovery would
place an undue burden on courts by encouraging too many defendants
to stand trial. That is, the number of defendants encouraged to stand
trial by discovery of weaknesses in the prosecutor's case or of evidence
favorable to their own case would be greater than the number of
defendants induced to plead guilty by discovery of a strong case against
them. But even if this prediction should prove correct, the reduced
risk of securing guilty pleas from innocent defendants or from de-
fendants unlikely to be convicted at trial would seem to justify placing
this additional burden upon the courts. Moreover, increased pros-
ecutorial concessions might well maintain the current guilty plea rate.
Although preplea discovery deprives the prosecutor of his superior
ability to assess the likelihood of conviction at trial, it does not reduce
the uncertainty inherent in the trial process.
II. EVIDENCE DISCOVERABLE PRIOR TO PLEA
Evidence discoverable prior to plea should include defendant's
written statements and confessions, reports of medical examinations and
scientific tests, names and statements of government witnesses, and
reports by investigating agencies." Discovery of such evidence is
necessary for assessing the probability of conviction at trial, but is un-
likely to encourage perjury or intimidation of witnesses-two evils
often alleged to result from allowing pretrial discovery.2
To assess the likelihood of conviction at trial, defense counsel must
obviously be able to evaluate both the evidentiary value and the ad-
missibility of a confession ' or other incriminating statement by the
defendant. Although rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure permits pretrial discovery of statements or confessions 24 with-
out a showing of materiality to the preparation of the defense,2 a
2 1 The following proposals for discovery of specific kinds of evidence are limited
to the federal system, in which the timing of pretrial procedure most readily accom-
modates preplea discovery. The defendant is expected to enter a plea of guilty or not
guilty at the arraignment, which occurs from one to four weeks after arrest, 2 L.
ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 10:22 (1966), thus
allowing sufficient time for discovery.
2 2 Moore, supra note 6, at 872-76.
2 3 In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), the Supreme Court held
that defense counsel's failure to predict the inadmissibility of a confession, subse-
quently ruled inadmissible on collateral attack, was not grounds for vacating a
guilty plea or even holding a hearing on a petition for habeas. The Court reasoned
that "[w]aiving trial entails the inherent risk that the good-faith evaluations of a
reasonably competent attorney will turn out to be mistaken either as to the facts or
as to what a court's judgment might be on given facts." Id. at 770. See also note 5
supra. To conclude, however, that a perfectly accurate assessment of the admissibility
of a confession is not constitutionally compelled should not preclude development of
procedures enabling defense counsel to make a more accurate assessment.
24 FED. R. Cxmx. P. 16(a); Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 54 GEo. LJ. 1276, 1277 (1966).
25 Compare FED. R. CRni. P. 16(a), with id. 16(b).
[Voi.119:527
PREPLEA DISCOVERY
request may be made under the rule only after the arraignment at which
a plea is entered.2" Yet preplea discovery of such information would
not encourage intimidation of witnesses, because none are involved,
nor would it significantly increase the danger of perjury, since the
defendant can already secure such information if he decides to go to
trial. Moreover, the police and the prosecutor would incur little ex-
pense in making available to the defendant copies of his statements.
Thus rule 16(a) should be amended to grant defendants the right to
preplea discovery of their statements or confessions.
Discovery of the results of medical and scientific tests 27 is essential
to redress the critical imbalance in resources available to defendant and
prosecutor. Although ballistics test results, fingerprints, blood samples,
or handwriting analyses may be the primary, or even the only, in-
culpating or exculpating evidence, the defendant will almost certainly
be unable to secure such data independently. Because discovery of this
evidence encourages neither perjury nor intimidation of witnesses and
because it can be easily made available, rule 16 should be amended to
afford defendants access to it.
Preplea discovery of the identity of government witnesses28 may
be less productive than discovery of other kinds of informataion. First,
defense counsel has no guarantee that a government witness will agree
to an interview, nor any way of compelling him to talk. 9 In fact, the
prosecutor may have instructed the witness to remain silent.30 Second,
voluntary defenders and court-appointed counsel usually lack the time
and resources to locate and interview these witnesses.
26See id. 16(f) ; note 7 supra.
27 FED. K. CRIM. P. 16(a) provides for pretrial discovery of "results or reports
of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments made in
connection with the partciular case, or copies thereof." See United States v. Bel-Mar
Laboratories, 284 F. Supp. 875, 887 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. Turner, 274
F. Supp. 412, 418 (E.D. Tenn. 1967). But see Hemphill v. United States, 392 F.2d
45, 48 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 877 (1968), in which the court held that the
denial of defendant's request to inspect reports of scientific experiments conducted
in connection with the case and the criminal records of the government's witnesses,
did not constitute reversible error. If the prosecutor permits inspection of his reports,
he may be required to allow the defendant to copy them. United States v. Cobb, 271
F. Supp. 159, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 396 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1968).
28Although the federal rulemakers may have contemplated discovery of the
names and addresses of prospective government witnesses, Rezneck, supra note 24,
at 1286, the courts have commonly denied such requests in noncapital cases. See, e.g.,
Cullen v. United States, 408 F.2d 1178 (8th Cir. 1969) ; United States v. Jordan, 399
F.2d 610 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1005 (1968) ; Archer v. United States, 393
F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 907 (1967); United States v. Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.J.
1968) ; United States v. Westmoreland, 41 F.R.D. 419 (S.D. Ind. 1967). Nor is the
Government required to give defendants the criminal records of its witnesses for
impeachment purposes. Hemphill v. United States, 392 F.2d 45, 48 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 877 (1968).29 FED. P. Cam. P. 15(a) provides for depositions only when "it appears that
a prospective witness may be unable to attend or prevented from attending" the trial
or hearing and his testimony is "material" and "necessary . . . to prevent a failure
of justice:'
3o Katz, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases: The Concept of Mutuality and
the Need for Reform, 5 Cmr. L. Bur.. 441, 454 (1969).
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But written statements by government witnesses may be highly
valuable to the defendant. Eyewitness reports may be the primary
incriminating evidence, and knowledge of the circumstances surround-
ing the witnesses' observations is essential to assess their probative
value. In accord with the Jencks Act,3 ' however, rule 16 prohibits
discovery of the names or statements of government witnesses. This
prohibition rests upon legitimate fears that defendants might threaten
or bribe witnesses and that disclosure of the identity of undercover
agents and informers would imperil their safety. Yet these dangers
do not compel denying the defense all access to statements of govern-
ment witnesses. Rule 16 might be amended to permit such discovery
at the discretion of the trial judge and with such protective orders as
he deems appropriate. 2 Although the potential for abuse is great, the
defendant has a strong interest in securing the fullest possible access to
information relevant in assessing the likelihood of conviction at trial.
Allowing the trial judge to issue protective orders or deny discovery
when he believes the risks of abuse are substantial would adequately
safeguard the Government's interest in protecting its witnesses without
foreclosing discovery in all cases.
Examination of the investigation report 33 containing the names
and observations of witnesses and other data gathered at the time of
the crime or shortly thereafter is probably the most adequate basis for
assessing the strength of the prosecutor's case. Both federal and
state courts, however, have condemned pretrial discovery of such re-
ports, either characterizing it as a "fishing expedition" 35 or holding
the report to be a privileged "work product" of the prosecutor.36 But
31 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964). The Act prohibits discovery of a "statement or
report . . . made by a Government witness or prospective Government witness . . .
until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case." It was
passed in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 657 (1957), which involved the prosecution of a labor union official for filing an
affidavit falsely stating that he was not a communist. The defendant's request that
the trial judge inspect the pretrial statements of government witnesses and deliver
admissible portions to him for impeachment purposes was denied. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that such statements should be available to the accused with-
out a preliminary judicial determination of their relevancy. Id. at 668-69. Congress,
fearful that the "decision would compel the Government to reveal confidential informa-
tion about anti-communist operations," legislatively overruled the decision by passing
the Act. Traynor, supra note 6, at 240. See generally Wexler, The Constitutional
Disclosure Duty and the Jencks Act, 40 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 206 (1966).
32 This amendment would require the repeal of the Jencks Act. See note 31 sutpra.
3 3 Rule 16 "does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda,
or other internal government documents made by government agents in connection
with the investigation or prosecution of the case." FED. R. CRIm. P. 16(b).
34 The United States Attorney for the Southern District of California has esti-
mated that for his district the report of the investigating agency will "normally reflect"
957o of the evidence that the Government will use at trial. Miller, The Omnibus
Hearing-An Experiment in Federal Criminal Discovery, 5 SAle DiEao L. Rv.
293 (1968).
35 See, e.g., United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; People
v. Johnston, 55 Misc. 2d 185, 186, 285 N.Y.S.2d 243, 245 (Tioga County Ct. 1967).
36 See, e.g., Doakes v. District Ct., 447 P.2d 461, 464 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968).
For a discussion of the work product doctrine in federal and state jurisdictions, see
Comment, Basic Survey of Work Product in Federal and State Jurisdictions in Civil
and Criminal Proceedings, 35 TE:Nx. L. Ray. 474 (1968).
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these concepts, imported from civil procedure, should not control in
criminal cases. A defendant unable to conduct his own investigation
must necessarily rely upon police investigation reports; access to them
is essential if he is to bargain as an equal with the prosecutor. Thus
the charge of "fishing expedition" is unjustified. Further, the pros-
ecutor's work product can be protected by appropriate judicial limita-
tions on the kinds of reports discoverable.
CONCLUSION
The "Omnibus Hearing Project," a recent experiment in the
Southern District of California,37 indicates that preplea discovery is
indeed feasible. Designed to facilitate handling of the district's heavy
caseload,"s the procedure permits broad discovery by defendants be-
tween arraignment and the omnibus hearing held three weeks later. 9
To the extent that the hearing realizes its purpose "[t]o allow the
defendant discovery so that he may make an informed decision as to
a plea of guilty," 40 it is the functional equivalent of preplea discovery.
Although the full impact of the hearing remains unclear, permitting
at least a form of preplea discovery apparently does not hinder the
efficient disposition of cases.
41
Preplea discovery will of course not eliminate the injustices and
inaccurate results produced by present plea bargaining practices. The
often unsatisfactory performance of plea bargaining results not only
from defendants deciding to plead guilty in ignorance of the likelihood
of conviction at trial, but also from the inconsistent bargaining practices
of prosecutors.4 But combined with the adoption of reforms urged
elsewhere in this issue ' to encourage more consistent bargaining by
prosecutors, preplea discovery would significantly increase the fairness
of the guilty plea process and insure an efficient allocation of trial
resources.
Steven L. Friedman
87 For a description of the project, see Miller, supra note 34.
8 In 1967, the district had the heaviest caseload in the country. ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES DisEICT
COuRTs, pt. 3, Appendix, Table D 3 (1967).
39 Omnibus Hearing Project, Form OH-1 (revised Jan. 2, 1968) (description
of the project); Omnibus Hearing Project, Form OH-3 (revised Jan. 2, 1968)
(describing discovery procedures and kinds of materials discoverable).
4 0 Form OH-I, supra note 39.
41 The omnibus hearing was established on April 1, 1967. Id. From June 1966
to June 1967, of all defendants convicted in the Southern District, 6.9% were con-
victed at trial. The figures for 1968 and 1969 were 12.2% and 8.6% respectively.
Letter from James A. McCafferty, Assistant Chief, Division of Procedural Studies
and Statistics, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, to the University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review, Feb. 25, 1970, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of
Pennsylvania. Thus it does not appear that the omnibus hearing significantly increases
the percentage of defendants who choose to stand trial rather than plead guilty.
42 See White, supra note 11, at 449-52.
4 3 Id. 453-62.
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